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The orthodox assumption in the banking literature is that capital requirements
are a binding constraint on banking behaviour. This is in con￿ ict with the empir-
ical observation that banks hold a bu⁄er of capital well in excess of the minimum
requirements. This paper develops a model where capital is endogenously deter-
mined within a pro￿t maximising equilibrium. Optimality involves balancing the
reduction in expected costs associated with regulatory breach with the excess cost
of ￿nancing from increasing capital. We demonstrate that when the equilibrium
probability of regulatory breach is less than one half, banks are expected to hold
precautionary capital.
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11 Introduction
This paper presents a model of the ￿nancing decision for the banking ￿rm. Virtually
all models of bank decision making that are based on optimising behaviour have been
concerned primarily with other questions and have not treated capital as a manager-
ial or bank decision variable. Rather, previous research (for example Kahane, 1977;
Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Zarruk and Madura; 1992) on
the impact of capital regulation tend to assume that capital requirements are binding
constraints on bank behaviour.
This assumption seemed justi￿ed for the early work in capital requirements. Saun-
ders and Wilson (1999) document bank capital ratios for Canadian, U.S. and U.K. banks
over a 100 year period between 1893 and 1992. There was a precipitous fall in capital
ratios in the thirty ￿ve years post World War 2 which many attribute to a federal safety
net - enjoyed by banks in most countries - that comprised of deposit insurance and a
lender of last resort. The problem with the safety net was that it sti￿ ed the market
incentives to maintain capital by insulating the counterparties in a banking contract
from the full e⁄ects of a bank default. Moreover, this moral hazard problem was even
greater for the largest banks which fell into the ￿ too-big-to-fail￿category and therefore
enjoyed regulatory protection from competition.1
In the U.S. this led regulators to impose formal restrictions on leverage in 1983, which
steadied the decline. Up till the inception of the Basel Capital Accord in 1988, capital
ratios remained low and very close to the regulatory minimum requirement, this lead
many academics and industry analysts to conclude that the ever increasing competitive
environment in which banks operated inevitably leads banks to maintain the lowest
permissible capital level. Although this ￿ corner solution￿assumption that has become a
standard feature of most academic models of banking may have suitably characterised
the period from the end of World War 2 until Basel was introduced, it has become
increasingly inappropriate over the last decade to ￿fteen years.
If we extend the time frame beyond that studied by Saunders and Wilson (1999),
even the most casual inspection of bank balance sheets will reveal stark inconsistencies
with the view that regulators impose binding capital constraints on banks. The follow-
ing tabulation reports the median capital ratios for banks in selected OECD countries
between 1990 and 1997. The data clearly show that banks hold capital well in excess of
the minimum regulatory requirement of 8 percent outlined in the Basel Accord. Similar
1The regulation of bank capital is therefore often justi￿ed to attain a balance between the con￿ icting
objectives of preventing costly bank runs with the moral hazard induced by the safety net (see Berger,
Herring and Szego, 1995; Kaufman, 1991; Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Keeley and Furlong, 1990).
2evidence is reported in Milne (2002) and Bernauer and Koubi (2002) who also show that
capital ratios of Japanese banks are similar to those of the European banks, while Ngo
(2006) calculates the mean capital ratio for a sample of 2500 U.S. banks between March
1996 and March 2005 to be 14.2 percent, well above the minimum requirement.
Table 1 Median Capital Ratios 1990-1997
The table reports the median capital ratios for banks in selected OECD countries between 1990
and 1997. The data clearly show that banks have capital ratios [(total capital/total assets) X 100]
well in excess of minimum regulatory requirement of 8 percent outlined in the Basel Accord. The
notation used in the table is de￿ned as follows: UK is the United Kingdom; US is the United
States; NL is the Netherlands. The ￿gures in the parentheses are the number of bank observations.
Germany France Italy NL UK US
1990 9.1 (4) 8.0 (8) 9.6 (4) - - 10.3 (8) 8.4 (2)
1991 8.8 (7) 8.7 (10) 9.0 (7) - - 12.0 (12) 9.6 (88)
1992 9.3 (7) 8.7 (11) 9.2 (10) 10.3 (3) 12.0 (13) 11.4 (224)
1993 9.1 (9) 9.0 (13) 9.7 (12) 11.2 (5) 13.1 (14) 11.9 (328)
1994 9.6 (10) 9.8 (13) 10.5 (15) 12.8 (8) 14.4 (17) 11.8 (409)
1995 9.4 (11) 9.7 (16) 11.0 (17) 12.5 (8) 15.0 (19) 12.1 (445)
1996 9.4 (11) 9.9 (16) 10.2 (15) 12.4 (8) 15.4 (18) 11.9 (445)
1997 9.9 (8) 10.4 (13) 10.2 (13) 10.8 (6) 14.2 (17) 11.8 (440)
1990-1997 9.4 (67) 9.2 (100) 10.1 (93) 11.3 (38) 14.2 (118) 11.8 (2381)
Source: de Bondt and Prast (1999).
What is more, Milne (2002) points out that viewing capital regulations as a system
of ex-ante enforcement is problematic since regulators are resource constrained and not
able to continuously monitor the capital position of banks. In the event that regulators
actually observe breach of capital requirements, regulators do not acquire total control
over the bank￿ s operations. Instead, regulators have a limited range of interventionary
measures which include involvement in the management process, public rebuke or in an
extreme case issuing a cease-and-desist order.
As an aside, it should be noted that this is not the ￿rst paper that has allowed cap-
ital to be a decision variable. However, previous papers analysing the capital decision
for banks have ignored any potential in￿ uence of minimum capital requirements on a
bank￿ s optimal level of capital. Baltensperger (1980) presents a model where banks
choose a level of capital that weighs up the bene￿ts of reduced insolvency costs against
the costs of holding more capital which is assumed to be greater than the cost of debt
- potential bankruptcy provides banks with an incentive to hold a positive amount of
capital. Pringle (1974) has also discussed the bank￿ s capital decision but in a model
that ignores bankruptcy costs, which is stressed in Baltensperger￿ s (1980) analysis. The
Pringle (1974) model treats the capital decision essentially as a liquidity management
3problem similar in vein to the reserve management models of Poole (1968) and Bal-
tensperger (1973). Under the assumption of imperfect capital markets, where deposits
follow a stochastic (although exogenous) distribution, he shows that banks can obtain
additional funds in the form of capital at a given marginal cost and that optimal capital
is attained when the excess marginal revenue on loans is equal to the excess marginal
cost of capital.
The reasons outlined above suggest that orthodox analysis, although convenient,
needs to be supplemented with alternative theories as to why and how banks choose
their capital ratios. The current paper presents a model in which bank capital is
determined endogenously in a pro￿t maximising equilibrium where capital regulations
act not as an ex-ante binding constraint, but rather, act more like a system of ex-post
sanctions for regulatory breach that provide banks with an ex-ante incentive to hold
capital in excess of o¢ cial requirements - what I call precautionary capital. Penalties
for regulatory breach need not be monetary, however, for simplicity we model the cost
of regulatory breach in monetary terms and view this cost as encapsulating all relevant
costs.
The present paper is most similar in ￿ avour to that of Milne and Whalley (2001) in
the sense that their paper also views capital regulation as an incentive mechanism rather
than a binding constraint. They develop a continuous time model with endogenous
capital to investigate bank risk taking behaviour under capital regulations with random
regulatory audit. They show that banks with su¢ cient franchise value maintain a bu⁄er
of excess capital and that regulatory capital requirements have no long-run e⁄ect on bank
risk taking. This paper however takes a very di⁄erent approach and seeks to answer
a di⁄erent set of questions. More precisely, we show that banks are expected to hold
precautionary capital to avoid the expected costs associated with breaching regulatory
guidelines and also demonstrate that this is expected to occur when the equilibrium
probability of regulatory breach is less than one half. The relevance of this ￿nding to
the policy debate is also explored.
It is also noted that, despite the aims of the Basel Accord to provide a ￿ level playing
￿eld￿by harmonising capital standards, there exists large di⁄erences in cross-national
capital ratios observed in the last decade (see Table 1). The model suggests that
a possible explanation for the observed di⁄erences in cross-national capital ratios is
the varying levels of severity of ex-post sanction in the event of breach (or regulatory
forbearance) at the national level. Consequently, the fact that U.S. and U.K. banks
hold more precautionary capital than their counterparts in Europe and Japan implies
that U.S. and U.K. regulators must be more severe with punishment in the event of
4regulatory breach. We look at anecdotal evidence from the U.S. which is suggestive
that one reason for believing that U.S. regulatory authorities are relatively stringent
is the result of political pressure from Congress to ￿ keep the banks in check￿after the
politically sensitive decision was made to provide a de facto bailout to U.S. banks in the
aftermath of the Latin American debt crises.
Notwithstanding this, some authors (the Basel Committee, 1999; Genschel and
Plumper, 1996) attribute the holding of capital in excess of regulatory guidelines to
￿ market discipline￿- for example, pressure from debt holders and ratings agencies. This
hypothesis however, does not adequately explain why smaller banks who do not borrow
on interbank markets or issue securities also hold precautionary capital. Nor does it
explain why there are large variations in cross-national capital ratios. The empirical
literature trying to assess whether market incentives have been the reason for the build
up in capital is in its infancy and has found mixed results. Flannery and Rangan (2004)
attribute the capital increase of the 1990s to enhanced market incentives to monitor
and price large banks￿default risks, while Bernauer and Koubi (2002) show that better
capitalised banks experience lower borrowing costs, thus if competition is strong, this in-
centive may be the reason for the widespread over-compliance with existing regulations.
They conclude however that competition is not su¢ cient to substitute for regulation
because signi￿cant systematic e⁄ects - such as free riding and moral hazard - continue
to exist.
This paper therefore provides an alternative explanation for the observation that
banks typically hold capital in levels well above what is o¢ cially required. It is possible
(most likely) that non-binding capital constraints are a result of market discipline as
well as banks trying to avoid the costs associated with breaching requirements, thus
the ￿ndings of this paper should be considered complementary to the market discipline
hypothesis.
It is also worth mentioning that prior empirical investigations into the e⁄ectiveness
of regulation in in￿ uencing actual capital levels have not produced a de￿nitive answer.
For example, Peltzman (1970) and Dietrich and James (1983) found no regulatory e⁄ect
on bank capital whereas Mingo (1975) and a recent study by de Bondt and Prast (1999)
￿nd that capital regulation seems to be e⁄ective in in￿ uencing bank capital ratios.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces a simple
model of bank optimisation similar to that of Baltensperger (1980). The model is then
extended to incorporate capital requirements and implications for policy are explored.
Section four suggests that a possible explanation for the observed di⁄erences in cross-
national capital ratios is the varying degrees of regulatory forbearance at the national
5level and provides evidence for why this may be the case. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a single period model of a banking ￿rm. At the start of the period the bank
accepts D dollars of deposits and o⁄ers a nominal return of i to depositors. The bank
also issues equity capital K 2 [0;L] at the beginning of the period at a cost of ￿ > i to
￿nance an exogenous loan portfolio L.2 Following Zarruk and Madura (1992) the bank
faces uncertainty regarding the amount of loan losses X 2 [0;L]. Let the probability
density of X be known to the banks and denote it f(X). The bank operates in a
competitive environment and receives the market loan rate r ￿ ￿ for its portfolio of
assets. At the beginning of the period, the banks balance sheet is given by:
L = D + K (1)
The goal of the bank is to select a capital structure so as to maximise its expected
pro￿ts when faced with bankruptcy costs. A bank is de￿ned to be bankrupt if, at the
end of the period, its assets plus period income is less than its accumulated debt. That
is, a bank is bankrupt if the following condition holds:
(L ￿ X) + r(L ￿ X) ￿ (1 + i)D < 0 (2)
By substituting in the budget constraint and rearranging so we have X on the left











L ￿ ^ X (3)
Equation (3) tells us that a bank becomes insolvent if loan losses exceed some critical
level ^ X. Given our assumptions, notice that ^ X is increasing in K, L, and r and
decreasing in i and D. Suppose that the cost of bankruptcy is positively related to
the capital de￿ciency (X ￿ ^ X), and for simplicity assume that the cost per dollar of




(X ￿ ^ X)f(X)dX (4)
2For now, we assume that there are no capital requirements and that ￿ and i are constant. We relax
these assumptions later in the paper.
3See appendix for derivation.
6Where the probability of bankruptcy is given by
R L
^ X f(X)dX. Optimality involves
choosing K to maximise expected pro￿t which is de￿ned as expected income from the




(L ￿ X)f(X)dX ￿ iD ￿ ￿K ￿ B (5)
The ￿rst order condition yields the following result.
Proposition 1 (Demand for Equity Capital)
The demand for equity capital K￿ must satisfy the following condition
￿BK = ￿ ￿ i (6)










The bank￿ s optimal decision involves balancing the expected costs of bankruptcy
against the additional cost of issuing equity instead of deposits. Equation (6) tells us
that at the optimum, the marginal cost of increasing equity by an in￿nitesimally small
amount, ￿￿i, is equal to the marginal bene￿t from the associated reduction in expected
bankruptcy costs ￿BK. The optimal demand for bank equity is therefore determined
by the magnitudes of ￿, i, r, c and the distribution of X.4 From equation (6) we also
have the following result:
Corollary 1 (Equilibrium Probability of Bankruptcy)
The equilibrium probability of failure is given by
Pr
￿



























< 1. For a given distribution of X, the equilibrium probability
of bankruptcy is increasing in ￿ and r and decreasing in i and c.
Proof. See appendix.
In other words, the bank should choose K such that the probability of bankruptcy







which is less than unity
and greater than zero. More generally, K￿ can be considered as the bank￿ s demand
for capital, and (7) makes this demand a function of the cost of equity capital, deposit
4Of course, an interior optimum also requires BKK > 0, otherwise corner solutions are obtained.
7rate, loan rate, cost per dollar of capital de￿ciency and the distribution of loan losses.
Inspection of (7) reveals the following comparative static results with regard to the
demand for equity capital:
Corollary 2 (Comparative Statics)
The demand for equity capital K￿ is decreasing in ￿ and r and increasing in i and
c. That is @K￿
@￿ < 0, @K￿
@r < 0, @K￿
@i > 0 and @K￿
@c > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
These results seem quite reasonable. An increase in the cost of capital, ceteris
paribus, increases the marginal cost of capital and thus the bank chooses to hold less of
it in equilibrium. On the other hand, increasing the deposit rate reduces the marginal
cost of capital and also increases the probability of bankruptcy. As a consequence banks
will hold more capital in equilibrium. For a given distribution of loan losses, an increase
in the loan rate increases the income earned on assets and thus banks are less likely to
fail than what is optimal. That is, it will reduce the probability of failure below what
is optimal - banks therefore adjust capital downwards. Finally, an increase in the cost
per dollar of capital de￿ciency leads to an increase in expected bankruptcy costs, banks
therefore increase capital such that there is a reduction in the equilibrium probability of
failure.
2.1 A Model with Capital Requirements
Up till now, we have ignored minimum capital requirements. They can easily be in-
corporated into this framework. Suppose the regulator requires that excess capital ￿
^ X ￿ X
￿
at the end of the period be at least equal to some ￿xed proportion q of end of
period loans (L ￿ X). That is,
￿
^ X ￿ X
￿
￿ q (L ￿ X). Consequently, a de￿ciency in
regulatory capital occurs if
￿
^ X ￿ X
￿









r ￿ i ￿ q (1 + r)
(1 + r)(1 ￿ q)
￿
L ￿ XR (8)
The preceding condition tells us that if loan losses exceed some critical level XR -
which is now in part determined by regulatory requirements - then a bank is in breach
of regulatory capital requirements. Once again, let the cost of regulatory breach be
positively related to the de￿ciency in regulatory capital (X ￿ XR), and also assume that
5See appendix for derivation.
8the cost per dollar of de￿ciency is constant at cR. The expected costs of regulatory




(X ￿ XR)f(X)dX (9)
Where the probability of regulatory breach is given by
R L
XR f(X)dX. In a similar
fashion to Milne (2002) we can think of these costs as an ex-post cost imposed by
regulators on shareholders if capital requirements are found to be breached. However,
and possibly of equal importance to the actual costs of regulatory breach are the costs
caused by the bank￿ s e⁄orts to avoid regulatory breach. A bank will start to rearrange
and reorganise its portfolio before breach actually occurs if its capital position falls below
some ￿ minimum￿level as a consequence of a ￿ poor￿year, in order to prevent breaching
regulatory requirements. Once again, optimality involves choosing K so as to maximise




(L ￿ X)f(X)dX ￿ iD ￿ ￿K ￿ R (10)
The ￿rst order condition yields an almost identical result as proposition 1:
Proposition 2 (Demand for Equity Capital under Regulatory Requirements)
When regulatory requirements on capital exist, the demand for equity capital K￿
R
must satisfy
￿RK = ￿ ￿ i (11)










Once again, we have the bank balancing up the additional costs of issuing capital with
the reduction in expected costs of regulatory breach. The marginal cost of increasing
capital remains the di⁄erence between the cost of capital and the deposit rate, ￿￿i, while
the marginal bene￿t is no longer the reduction in expected bankruptcy costs, rather it
is the reduction in expected costs of regulatory breach. Notice now that the demand
for capital is also a function of q as well as ￿, i, r, c and the distribution of X. We also
have the following result:
Corollary 3 (Equilibrium Probability of Regulatory Breach)












r ￿ i ￿ q (1 + r)



















< 1 and for a given distribution of X, the equilibrium
probability of regulatory breach is increasing in ￿ and r and decreasing in q, i and cR.
Proof. See appendix.
We can see from the right hand side of (12) that the demand for bank capital now
depends on the cost of capital, the deposit rate, the cost per dollar of regulatory capital
de￿ciency, the market loan rate and the minimum capital ratio. It is reasonably straight
forward to verify that the result in corollary 2 remains valid with the introduction of
capital requirements. In addition to the comparative static results of corollary 2, by
inspection of equation (12) we have:
Corollary 4 (Capital Requirements and the Demand for Capital)
In addition to the comparative statics presented in corollary 2 we also have that the
demand for equity capital is increasing in q and cR. That is,
@K￿
R





This result is intuitively appealing, if regulators impose a higher cost per dollar of
de￿ciency or more stringent regulatory requirements on banks, then all things equal,
banks will be more likely to breach regulatory guidelines and be subject to the costs
associated with breach. This increases the expected costs of regulatory breach and
therefore it is optimal for banks to reduce the equilibrium probability of regulatory
breach and increase their demand for equity capital.
2.1.1 Precautionary Regulatory Capital
This model proves particularly useful in understanding bank holdings of capital in excess
of what is o¢ cially required by regulators. Recall we have assumed that the bank -
well, at least the manager of regulatory capital - has an unbiased view of the random
process leading to loan losses and therefore has an unbiased expectation of the value of
loan losses at the end of the period, E (X). For this section, it is useful to rewrite (12)
in the following fashion:
10Pr[X ￿ E (X) > X￿








The right hand side of the inequality in (13) gives the expected value of excess or
precautionary regulatory capital, that is, capital that is held over and above what is
required by regulatory guidelines. Note that for there to be expected precautionary
capital we require that X￿
R > E (X) otherwise there is an expected de￿ciency in regula-
tory capital and therefore an expectation that the bank will breach minimum regulatory
requirements. If we assume that f (X) is a symmetrical distribution, we can infer that
a condition that must be met in order for banks to hold precautionary regulatory capital

















2 then banks will
be expected to have a de￿ciency in regulatory capital. Finally, if the optimal proba-
bility of regulatory breach is equal to one half then the bank will choose K￿
R such that
X￿
R ￿ E (X) is zero and be expected to hold the exact amount of capital required. Of
course, actual precautionary capital or capital de￿ciency will depend on the value of X
that actually occurs.
The expected value of precautionary capital, if any, is given by the partial expectation
of X over the range of X that would lead to expected precautionary capital, while the
expected value of capital de￿ciency, if any, is the partial expectation of X over the range
of X that would lead to an expected capital de￿ciency.6 The preceding discussion can
be summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Expected Precautionary Regulatory Capital)
Let F (X) denote the distribution of X, where
dF(X)








1. If ￿ = 1
2, K￿
R is chosen such that X￿
R ￿ E (X) = 0 and banks are expected to hold
the exact amount of regulatory capital required.
2. If ￿ < 1
2, K￿
R is chosen such that X￿
R ￿ E (X) > 0 and banks are expected to hold



























6See Winkler et al. (1972) for more on partial moments.
113. If ￿ > 1
2, K￿
R is chosen such that X￿
R ￿ E (X) < 0 and banks are expected to have


















F (X)dX ￿ X￿
R (15)
Proof. See appendix.
This result provides us with conditions under which we would expect banks to hold
capital in excess of what is o¢ cially required. The model serves well in explaining the
observed phenomena of non-binding capital requirements. We see that so long as the
equilibrium probability of regulatory breach is su¢ ciently low (less than one half) then
banks are expected to hold a bu⁄er of capital over and above regulatory guidelines to
avoid the expected costs associated with regulatory breach. The next section goes on to
explore questions that are of potential relevance to the current policy debate on capital
requirements.
2.1.2 Some Policy Considerations
Recall from corollary 3 that the equilibrium probability of breach depends on the deposit
rate, the market rate for loans, the cost of capital, the minimum regulatory capital
requirement and the cost per dollar of regulatory capital de￿ciency. Of these factors, two
are under the direct control of regulators - the minimum regulatory capital requirement
and the regulatory cost per dollar of capital de￿ciency. Given that minimum capital
requirements are today removed from the domain of national regulators and are largely
determined within the Basel Committee framework, the only real policy instrument
available to national regulators hoping to in￿ uence banking behaviour is ￿ regulatory
pressure￿or the severity of regulatory sanction if capital requirements are breached. In
the current framework, the idea of regulatory pressure or severity of sanction can be
captured generally by the regulatory cost per dollar of capital de￿ciency, cR.
A higher cost per dollar of capital de￿ciency which can be viewed as a higher degree
of regulatory pressure or severity of ex-post sanction in the event of breach. It is clear
from corollary 3 and proposition 3 that a higher cR is associated with a lower equilibrium
probability of breach and thus higher expected value of precautionary capital.7 It is
7The positive relationship between cR and the expected value of precationary capital is clear from
equation (A16) in the appendix. Corollary 4 tells us that
@K￿
R













Xf (X)dX is increasing in
cR.
12therefore useful to look at some possible policy prescriptions with reference to the cost
per dollar of regulatory capital de￿ciency.
Lemma 1 (Precautionary Capital and the Cost per Dollar of Breach)








Then for the equilibrium probability of regulatory breach to be less than half such that
banks are expected to hold precautionary capital, we require that
cR > 2￿c(1 ￿ q) (16)
Proof. See appendix.
This results follows directly from setting the right hand side of (12) to be less than
one half and rearranging. If regulators desire banks to hold an expected bu⁄er of capital
above o¢ cial requirements, then this result tells us that there is a minimum level of ex-
post ￿ severity￿that will induce banks to hold a bu⁄er of free capital ex-ante. The next
result follows by construction of the model:
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium Probability of Bankruptcy and Regulatory Breach)
1. In equilibrium, the loan loss threshold for bankruptcy is always at least as big as
the loan loss threshold for regulatory breach, that is ^ X￿ ￿ X￿
R. Correspondingly,
the equilibrium probability of regulatory breach is always at least as big as the
equilibrium probability of bankruptcy.
2. Since the equilibrium probability of regulatory breach is always at least as big as the
equilibrium probability of bankruptcy, it must be the case that
cR ￿ c(1 ￿ q) (17)
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 2 tells us that by construction, the equilibrium probability of regulatory
breach is always at least as big as the equilibrium probability of bankruptcy and therefore
places an upper limit on the cost per dollar of regulatory capital de￿ciency. Given these
results, can we identify conditions under which regulation can be viewed as ￿ e⁄ective￿ .
Proposition 4 (￿ E⁄ective￿Policy)
E⁄ective regulation of banks requires that the per dollar cost of regulatory breach, cR,
satisfy the following condition
132￿c(1 ￿ q) < cR ￿ c(1 ￿ q) (18)
which implies that the equilibrium probability of bankruptcy will be less than one half
and we expect the bank to survive.
Proof. See appendix.
If the goal of regulatory authorities is to prevent banking failure - more precisely,
reduce the probability of bankruptcy so that the bank is expected to survive - then the
previous result tells us that, ceteris paribus, regulators should set the cost per dollar of
de￿ciency above some minimum up to the maximum allowable by construction. Note
however that ￿ e⁄ective￿regulation in the sense that it reduces the equilibrium probability
of bankruptcy does not necessarily mean optimal regulation. One can think of regula-
tors as choosing cR to maximise their own objective function, which we have no prior
reason for believing coincides with some social welfare function that an omniscient and
benevolent regulator aims to maximise. Optimality of regulation requires an analysis of
the trade-o⁄s between achieving ￿nancial soundness and potential e¢ ciency losses from
regulation, which this paper does not address.8
We have demonstrated that for regulation to be e⁄ective in the presence of a pre-
determined minimum capital standard such as those set out by the Basel Accord, the
severity of ex-post sanction (value of cR) in the event of breach needs to be set above
some minimum.
It has already been mentioned that the bu⁄er of precautionary capital is positively
related to the severity of ex-post sanction. That is, as the cost per dollar of de￿ciency
increases so does the expected value of precautionary capital. With this in mind, is this
fact not only a potential explanation for observing non-binding regulatory requirements,
but also and explanation for the large cross-national di⁄erences in the capital ratios? It
is clear from Table 1 as well as the evidence presented in Bernauer and Koubi (2002)
that banks in the U.S. and U.K. tend to hold more precautionary capital than European
and Japanese banks. Moreover, this trend has continued and for the time period beyond
that reported in Table 1 we have seen an even greater divergence in these cross-national
capital ratios. Can the possible explanation for this simply be that U.S. and U.K.
regulators are stricter in the sense that they are less forbearing or impose more severe
penalties in the event of regulatory breach? This question is di¢ cult to answer in
a theoretical inquiry and requires a detailed empirical analysis, which is itself not an
8The interested reader should refer to Santomero and Watson (1977) and Giammarino, Lewis and
Sappington (1993) for discussion on the optimality of regulation.
14easy task mainly due to the di¢ culty associated with measuring ￿ regulatory pressure￿or
severity of ex-post sanctions (Marcus, 1983). Nevertheless, is there reason to suspect
that U.S. and U.K. regulators are less forbearing today relative to regulators in Europe
and Japan? I argue yes and provide anecdotal evidence which, although far from
de￿nitive, is at least suggestive below. However, before this a few slight extensions to
the model are developed and discussed brie￿ y in the next section.
2.2 Extensions
The Cost of Deposits. Producing and maintaining demand deposits requires a real
resource expense to the bank. Up to this point, we have assumed for simplicity that
these costs were zero. We can introduce a simple cost function C (D) where CD > 0 and
CDD > 0 as an explicit representation of this element. The critical value of X above











L ￿ C(D) ￿ ^ X (19)









r ￿ i ￿ q (1 + r)










(L ￿ X)f(X)dX ￿ iD ￿ ￿K ￿ R ￿ C(D) (21)
Consequently, the condition for optimality is:
￿RK = ￿ ￿ (i + CD) (22)










As we can see, the inclusion of an explicit cost function does not change the results
signi￿cantly. The interpretation of the optimality condition still remains that banks
should continue to issue equity until the marginal bene￿t of a reduction in the expected
costs of regulatory breach is equal to the marginal cost of holding more expensive capital.
The only di⁄erence now is that with the introduction of the cost function, ceteris paribus,
9Note that CD = ￿CK since the balance sheet constraint requires that L = D + K.
15banks will tend to hold more capital in equilibrium relative to the model with no explicit
cost function since, for some given increase in capital, the fall in expected costs of
regulatory breach is higher and the additional cost of holding more capital is lower.
The Cost of Capital. Up till now, we have assumed that banks face a perfectly elastic
supply of capital such that they have access to an in￿nite supply of capital at some
constant cost. Some authors (for example Mingo and Wolkowitz, 1977) suggest that
this assumption may be unrealistic and assume that banks face an upward sloping supply
of capital function so a bank cannot issue new equity without incurring an increasing
cost of capital. With this consideration in mind we can represent the cost of capital as
￿ = ￿(K) with ￿K > 0 and ￿KK > 0.
The Deposit Rate. As with the cost of equity capital, we have previously assumed
that banks face a perfectly elastic supply of deposits. Consequently banks paid out a
nominal constant interest rate for all deposits which is independent of the banks￿chosen
equity-deposits ratio. As pointed out by Baltensperger (1980), with the existence of
expected costs of regulatory breach (and bankruptcy) this assumption does not seem
justi￿ed. The possibility of regulatory breach (or bankruptcy) implies that the expected
return on deposits will be less than the nominal return paid by banks. Thus given some
nominal deposit rate, the expected deposit rate is a function of the level of deposits
- a higher level of deposits lowers the expected deposit rate. Note however that in
a competitive banking system, banks will o⁄er depositors a compensating adjustment
in the nominal deposit rate whenever the expected deposit rate is lowered due to an
increase in deposits. To incorporate these ideas into the framework, we let the deposit
rate be a function of the level of deposits i = i(D) with iD > 0 and iDD > 0.
Ignoring again the resource costs of producing and maintaining demand deposits, we
can incorporate the idea of an increasing cost of capital and an increasing deposit rate




(L ￿ X)f(X)dX ￿ i(D)D ￿ ￿(K)K ￿ R (23)
The ￿rst order condition yields the following result:
￿(RK + iDD) = ￿ ￿ i + ￿KK (24)








f(X)dX. Once again, allowing for
an increasing cost of capital and increasing deposit rate yields a similar condition for
optimality as (11). The interpreting remains the same - banks should continue to issue
16equity until the marginal bene￿t from doing so equals the marginal cost. Here the
marginal bene￿t is the reduction in expected costs associated with regulatory breach
￿RK plus the reduction in interest costs for all infra-marginal deposits ￿iDD as a
result of holding less deposits and more capital. The marginal cost is now not only
the additional cost of capital over and above the deposit rate, ￿ ￿ i, of holding an extra
increment of capital but also the increase in cost of all infra-marginal equity held, ￿KK.
It is di¢ cult to say whether in equilibrium, the introduction of increasing capital and
interest costs will lead to a higher or lower level of capital relative to the baseline model.
Introducing an increasing cost of capital increases the marginal cost of capital but leaves
marginal bene￿t unchanged so would induce banks to hold less capital. On the other
hand, having increasing interest costs increases the marginal bene￿t of holding more
capital but leaves the marginal cost unchanged so would lead banks to hold more capital
in equilibrium. Thus the net result is uncertain.
3 A Shred of Evidence
Those studying international banking regulation have argued that capital regulations
impose substantial costs on banks, thus the preferences and behaviour of both regula-
tors and banks are strongly shaped by a ￿ level playing ￿eld￿or rent seeking logic (see for
example Oatley and Nabors, 1998). Yet if compliance with capital adequacy require-
ments were very costly and thus a⁄ected the domestic and international competitiveness
of banks, why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? And why
do national regulators continue to tolerate the large variations in cross-national capital
ratios if the aim of the Basel Accord was to provide a level playing ￿eld by harmonising
capital standards?
It has been argued in this paper that part of the reason we observe banks holding
precautionary capital is to avoid the expected costs associated with regulatory breach.
We have also suggested that the reason for the observed variations in cross-national
capital ratios is due to cross-national di⁄erences in regulatory pressure or severity of
sanction when capital guidelines are breached. The data reveal that U.S. and U.K.
banks hold substantially more precautionary capital than European or Japanese banks
and the predictions of the model imply that this is because U.S. and U.K. regulators
are less forbearing than regulators in Europe or Japan. This section aims to provide
evidence for why this may be the case and argues that the stringency of regulatory
authorities in the U.S. today relative to their counterparts in Europe and Japan is a
result of political pressure on regulatory authorities to ￿ keep the banks in check￿after
17a de facto bailout for U.S. banks was granted by U.S. Congress in the aftermath of the
Latin American debt crises. A similar story can be told for the U.K. but we do not
provide it in the present paper. That is, we argue that banks are simply paying the
price now - in terms of less regulatory forbearance - for the bailout they received in the
early 1980s.
3.1 Trouble in Paradise: Weakness in U.S. Banks
Loans to developing countries - like those in Latin America - are high risk since they
carry a high chance of default. Losing assets due to default will eat into banks￿capital
reserves, thus those who have low capital reserves relative to exposure would be most
likely to fail. We thus turn our attention to data on the exposure of G-10 commercial
banks to less developed countries￿(LDC) borrowers and capital asset ratios.
Table 2 LDC Exposure of Commercial Banks 1988
The following table presents data on the exposure of G-10 commercial banks to less
developed countries￿(LDC) borrowers in 1988. Exposure is calculated as [(loans to
LDCs/capitalisation) X 100]. The data clearly show an uneven pattern. U.S. banks
were the most exposed, with the ratio of exposure to developing country risk being
between 93 percent for the least vulnerable banks and the most exposed at almost
twice their capitalisation.
Country Exposure (% of Capitalisation)
United States 93-199
United Kingdom 27-82
Japan and Europe under 55
Source: de Carmoy (1990)
Data on LDC exposure (Table 2) shows an uneven pattern. U.S. banks were the
most exposed, with the ratio of exposure to developing country risk calculated according
to the banks￿capitalisation being between 93 percent for the least vulnerable banks and
the most exposed at almost twice their capitalisation. In 1987, the top 200 banks in the
U.S. had some $30 bn in reserves for default on LDC loans. The losses on LDC loans
recorded by the six leading American banks that eventuated were so large that they
were only o⁄set by the 1987 gains of the United State￿ s seventy other largest banks (de
Carmoy, 1990). British, European and Japanese banks were much less exposed. For
British banks, the margin was 27 percent to 82 percent of capitalisation. Japanese and
European banks were in a much stronger position, with a ratio below 55 percent. Thus
only American banks were exposed above capitalisation.
Examination of provisions for default and banks￿shareholder equity for various coun-
tries (Table 3 and 4) reveals that American banks, who were involved in very risky lending
18activities, have considerably higher capital-to-asset and equity-to-asset ratios than the
Japanese, who for tax purposes - and considering the quality of their commercial loans
and size of hidden reserves of security and real estate - had a particularly low level of
equity and provisions for doubtful loans. British banks￿situation appears to be closer
to that of the U.S. than to Japan.
Table 3 Capital Assets Ratios of G-10 Banks, 1981-1989
The following table presents data on the capital-assets-ratios [total capital/total assets] for selected
G-10 banks between 1981 and 1989. The ￿gures presented are percentages. The data reveal that
American banks, who were involved in very risky lending activities (see table 2), have considerably
higher capital-to-asset ratios than the Japanese, who for tax purposes - and considering the quality
of their commercial loans and size of hidden reserves of security and real estate - had a particularly
low level of equity and provisions for doubtful loans. British banks￿situation appears to be closer
to that of the U.S. than to Japan.
Bank 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 Ave.
European Banks
Banque Nationale de Paris 1.28 1.34 1.53 1.51 1.98 3.15 3.17 2.83 2.10
Banque Bruxelles Lambert 1.81 1.49 1.68 1.55 1.61 2.10 2.04 2.10 1.80
Dresdner Bank 2.93 2.88 2.68 2.66 2.82 3.24 3.23 3.30 2.97
Allgemeine Bank 2.37 2.52 2.75 2.67 2.91 3.51 3.96 3.68 3.05
Deutsche Bank 3.10 3.27 3.24 3.33 3.99 3.93 4.06 3.78 3.59
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 3.85 3.84 2.88 4.11 4.70 5.39 3.80 3.80 4.05
Barclays 4.66 4.68 4.56 3.53 5.07 4.71 4.83 5.57 4.70
Union des Banques Suisse 5.67 5.14 4.97 5.09 5.78 5.71 6.08 6.10 5.57
American Banks
Citicorp 3.80 3.98 4.58 4.50 4.64 4.73 4.33 4.84 4.43
Bank of America 3.54 3.97 4.45 4.50 3.96 3.39 3.59 4.45 3.98
Chase Manhattan 4.77 4.26 4.75 4.93 5.25 5.37 3.31 4.34 4.62
Japanese Banks
Sumitomo 3.13 2.95 2.96 2.25 2.85 2.95 2.20 2.55 2.73
Dai Ichi Kangyo 3.26 2.86 2.63 2.51 2.38 2.38 1.79 2.75 2.57
Fuji 3.51 3.00 2.98 2.82 2.82 2.89 2.20 2.75 2.87
Source: de Carmoy (1990)
The important point to note is that the pattern in capital-to-asset and equity-to-asset
ratios is consistent with the lending portfolios of the banks - American and British banks,
holding riskier portfolios due to a higher concentration of loans to LDCs, were carrying
more capital than the less exposed Japanese and European banks. The data indicate a
severe weakness in U.S. commercial banks (Oatley and Nabors, 1998).
As a result, any negative shock to the Latin American countries will have signi￿cantly
larger adverse consequences for U.S. and U.K. banks by comparison to banks in Japan
and Europe. Table 5 demonstrates this point by presenting data on American bank
19failures between 1981 and 1988, it shows a sharp increase in bank failures in 1983 in the
wake of the Latin American debt crises and a steady increase there on in. Out of a total
of approximately 14000 banks, 644 (4.6 percent) went bankrupt between 1985 and 1988.
Over the same period no Japanese banks went insolvent while the number of European
banks that failed was signi￿cantly less than in the United States.
Table 4 Equity to Assets Ratios of G-10 Banks, 1983-1988
The following table presents data on the equity-to-assets ratios [total equity/total assets]
for selected G-10 banks between 1983 and 1988. The ￿gures presented are percentages.
The data reveal that American banks, who were involved in very risky lending activities
(see table 2), have considerably higher equity-to-asset ratios than the Japanese, who for tax
purposes - and considering the quality of their commercial loans and size of hidden reserves
of security and real estate - had a particularly low level of equity and provisions for doubtful
loans. British banks￿situation appears to be closer to that of the U.S. than to Japan.
Banks 83 84 85 86 87 88 Ave.
Japanese Banks
Dai Ichi Kangyo 2.63 2.51 2.38 2.38 1.79 2.41 2.35
Sumitomo 2.96 2.25 2.85 2.95 2.20 2.55 2.63
Fuji 2.98 2.83 2.82 2.89 2.20 2.55 2.71
Mitsubishi 2.83 2.85 2.88 2.99 2.14 2.58 2.71
Sanwa 2.78 2.67 2.70 2.61 1.96 2.46 2.53
Industrial Bank of Japan 2.33 2.38 2.84 2.80 2.43 3.12 2.65
Norinchukin Bank 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.55 0.50
Mitsubishi Trust & Banking 0.23 2.18 2.06 2.22 2.34 3.08 2.02
Tokai 0.45 2.51 2.65 2.60 1.62 2.38 2.04
Sumitomo Trust & Banking 0.28 2.34 2.15 2.29 1.43 1.80 1.72
Mitsui 2.41 2.43 2.36 2.52 1.88 1.32 2.15
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan 0.47 2.08 2.05 2.11 2.37 2.93 2.00
American Banks
Citicorp 4.58 4.50 4.64 4.73 4.33 4.84 4.60
Chase Manhattan 4.75 4.93 5.25 5.37 3.31 4.34 4.66
Bank of America 4.45 4.50 3.96 3.39 3.59 4.45 4.06
European Banks
CrØdit Agricole 4.24 4.15 4.26 4.36 4.43 4.08 4.25
Banque Nationale de Paris 1.53 1.51 1.98 3.15 3.17 2.83 2.36
Deutsche Bank 3.24 3.33 3.99 3.93 4.06 3.78 3.72
CrØdit Lyonnais - 1.14 1.23 1.91 2.64 3.02 1.99
Barclays 4.56 3.53 5.07 4.71 4.89 5.57 4.72
National Westminster 4.79 3.68 4.10 5.54 5.70 6.11 4.99
SociØtØ GenØralØ 1.32 1.36 2.03 2.90 3.23 3.35 2.37
Midland 3.61 2.74 3.18 3.80 5.34 5.45 4.02
Source: de Carmoy (1990)
20Table 5 American Bank Failures, 1981-1988
The table presents data on American bank failures between 1981
and 1988, it shows a sharp increase in bank failures in 1983 in
the wake of the Latin American debt crises and a steady increase
there on in. Out of a total of approximately 14000 banks, 644
(4.6 percent) went bankrupt between 1985 and 1988.







Source: de Carmoy (1990)
3.2 The Latin American Debt Crisis Bailout
In 1982-83 there was a sudden intensi￿cation of external economic pressures on the U.S.
banking system that proved to be the catalyst for the decisive resolution of the capital
adequacy issue at the domestic level. To be precise, it was the materialisation of the
industrialising countries￿debt crises in 1982 that exposed the insu¢ ciency of capital
reserve levels of the U.S. multinational banks to bu⁄er against such external shocks.
This led to concerns that imprudent lending practices by these banks was undermining
the stability of the entire U.S. banking system. At the same time, Congress - that
was up till this point relatively laissez faire with regard to capital adequacy - began to
mobilise and enter the capital adequacy debate.
Word began to spread in the early part of 1982 that the International Monetary
Fund￿ s (IMF) resources were considerably strained by a number of ￿nancial problems in
Latin American debtor countries. These rumours came to fruition in August of 1982
when Mexico announced that it would not be able to meet their ￿nancial obligations on
debts totalling $81 billion USD, of which, $23 billion USD was owed to U.S. multination-
als. The problem was exacerbated in November and December when, ￿rst, Argentina
declared that it was experiencing ￿nancial di¢ culty and second, Brazil noti￿ed its cred-
itors that it would not be able to honour payments due on an external debt exceeding
$79 billion USD. In short, by the middle of 1982, the nine largest banks in the U.S. had
lent over 140 percent of their capital, which totalled to loans of $30 billion USD to these
three countries alone (Reinke, 1995).
Following this, a meeting of the IMF member countries agreed that an increase in
IMF resources was desperately needed which culminated in 1983 with a planned increase
21of IMF resources by 47 percent or approximately $32 billion USD, of which, the U.S.
share - which needed the approval of Congress - was in the order of $8.4 billion USD. The
fact that the rescue package required Congressional approval meant that Congress held
all the chips when it came to the bargaining table with the three regulatory authorities
and commercial banks.10 At the time, America was experiencing one of the worst
recessions since World War 2, so even before legislation authorising the funds was sent
to Capitol Hill by the Reagan Administration there was strong opposition against the
IMF quota increase (Reinke, 1995). The general consensus was that the IMF quota
increase was nothing but a sophisticated de facto bailout for the big U.S. banks. In the
words of Ferdinand St. Germain, chairman of the House Banking Committee:
￿ [A]t a time when millions stand in unemployment lines and thousands of
small businesses are ￿ling bankruptcy petitions, the idea of an international
bailout for adventurous U.S. bankers may not be the most popular item on
the agenda.￿ 11
Despite this, the Reagan administration, regulatory authorities and the private banks
continued to push their agenda. They argued that not approving an increase in IMF
resources would lead to a ￿nancial disaster for the heavily exposed multinational banks,
which would ultimately lead to a domestic and international crises not only in the ￿-
nancial sector but also the real economy because a credit crunch would be the most
likely outcome if the Latin American countries defaulted (Reinke, 1995). Members of
Congress were well aware of the dilemma facing them, as Senator Jim Sasser put it:
￿ I think it is a Hobson￿ s choice. We are damned if we do and damned if we
don￿ t.￿ 12
Faced with this quandary, Congress realised that they would have to eventually yield
to political pressure and approve the IMF quota increase. Nevertheless, they wanted
10The three federal regulatory bodies are the O¢ ce of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal
Reserve (Fed), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Unlike Australia where banking
regulation and supervision is carried out by a single federal regulatory body: the Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority (APRA), U.S. banking regulation is decentralised. One of the principal char-
acteristics of the U.S. regulatory structure is the dual banking system. This allows banks to charter
at either the federal or the state level. The result is there are 50 state legislatures that have decision
making authority. The state regulatory agencies are respesented in Washington by the Conference of
State Bank Supervisors, which monitors all federal regulatory activity that could in any way intrude on
their regulatory power. For a more detailed examination of the U.S regulatory structure see Reinke
(1995).
11As quoted in Reinke, W. H. (1995), Banking, Politics and Global Finance: American Commercial
Banks and Regulatory Change, 1980-90, Edward Elgar Publishing: Vermont, USA., pg. 143.
12Ibid.
22to minimise the political backlash from their constituencies and were adamant to attach
amendments to the IMF quota increase vis a vis the behaviour of commercial banks and
extort credible commitments from both the regulatory agencies and the banks that such
a ￿ bailout￿would not be repeated. During the course of hearings on the quota increase,
Congress shifted its attention from the banks to the regulators, the feeling in Congress
towards the regulators was probably best captured by Senator William Proxmire who,
in a hearing in early 1983, remarked:
￿ Where were our bank regulators when all this foreign debt was piling up?...They
did everything except regulate.￿ 13
While making some concessions, the regulators were generally reluctant to take the
blame for the debt crisis. Chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time, Paul Volker,
judged that the basic framework of the system introduced in 1979 was sound and warned
Congress not to over react with excessive regulations, further, he had this to say in
response to the criticisms of Congress:
￿ [I]n the past decade there has been a view by some of the banking community
that capital is irrelevant, and that one shouldn￿ t worry about capital ratios,
and that capital ratios declining are not very important.￿ 14
The federal regulators put on a united front in reaction to Congress and agreed in
principle that capital standards of the large multinational banks should be strengthened
however still de￿ed congressional calls for more stringent regulation on the grounds that
capital supervision was a matter concerning the regulators and not Congress. More to
the point, the regulators were sympathetic to the calls of the money centre banks that
stricter capital regulations will put them at an international competitive disadvantage,
to illustrate, Paul Volker had this to say to the legislature:
￿ [B]anks undoubtedly have felt under very heavy pressure internationally,
and carrying more capital is costly.￿ 15
To prevent any further intervention by Congress and to accelerate the IMF quota
increase, the three regulatory agencies presented to Congress a ￿ve point programme
to strengthen the supervision of international lending. This programme however, did
13As quoted in Reinke (1995), pg. 144.
14Ibid.
15Ibid.
23not contain any speci￿c policy proposal with regard to capital adequacy, rather, the
regulators agreed that their existing constitutional authority was su¢ cient to implement
a new regulatory reform programme independently without the need for any legislative
action. The banks were opposed to the ￿ve point regulatory programme developed by
the agencies to appease Congress and even more opposed to the possibility of legislative
action by Congress, according to the vice chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank:
￿ A tighter web of administrative controls around the foreign lending of banks,
as some have suggested, would be unwise, unnecessary and counter produc-
tive.￿ 16
The discontent of the large multinational banks did not sit well with Congress who
argued that the money centre banks shared considerable responsibility for the debt crises
because of their imprudent behaviour. Congress viewed the IMF quota increase as a
bailout for the banks by the American tax payer, thus argued that any increase in the
U.S. contribution must be accompanied with a tightening of capital standards to ensure
that a recurrence of such a bailout would not occur (Reinke, 1995).
Thus, up till this point, aside from some minor concessions made to Congress by the
regulatory agencies, there appeared to be a stand o⁄ between Congress and the regula-
tors. However, a second event further shifted the balance of power towards Congress.
Although the banks had previously lobbied against new and stricter requirements, none
had formally challenged the regulatory authorities. This status quo was changed when
in February of 1983, the First National Bank of Bellaire formally challenged the OCC￿ s
authority to impose explicit capital requirements and issue a ￿ cease and desist￿order
if banks did not comply. The First National Bank of Bellaire obtained a ruling in its
favour in the courts of appeal. This ruling cast severe doubt over the regulatory agen-
cies￿authority and legitimacy to enforce capital standards and meant that the only way
for the regulators to restore their institutional capacity was for Congress to step in and
explicitly change legislation such that the federal regulators had the authority to impose
and enforce minimum capital standards. Congress now held all the bargaining chips
and indicated that it was willing to provide such authority in return for a promise from
the regulators that they will act on the concerns about ￿nancial stability and capital
adequacy; the regulators had no choice but to submit to Congress, as Reinke (1995) put
it:
￿ Given the legislature￿ s determination to go beyond what the regulatory
16As quoted in Reinke (1995), pg. 145.
24agencies had initially proposed; the regulators￿dependence upon Congress
to enact legislation that would restore their credibility in establishing capital
levels; and the urgency to get the IMF quota increase, the Fed, which had
been most resistant to any speci￿c ratios for [multinational banks], quickly
acquiesced to Congress.￿ 17
The Senate was quick to respond to the pledge by the regulators to implement min-
imum capital ratios for multinational banks and approved a bill authorising an $8.4
billion increase in the U.S. IMF contribution on the 8th of June 1983. The regulators
kept their promise and on the 13th of June, the Fed and the OCC released a series of
changes to their earlier guidelines in order to bring multinational banks, who were previ-
ously largely excluded from, into line with other commercial banks under a uniform set
of regulations. These amendments saw, for the ￿rst time, regulations that set explicit
minimum capital ratios for multinational banks. Nevertheless, progress in the House
was much slower, a lobbyist described the situation in the House well, suggesting that:
￿ [N]obody, not one member of Congress, is going to win votes back home on
this unless [Citibank Chairman] Wriston lives in their district.￿ 18
In spite of these concerns, the bill was narrowly approved on the 3rd of August 1983,
winning 217 to 211 (Reinke, 1995). Finally, after further deliberation, in early Novem-
ber, the bill was approved and Congress passed the International Lending Supervisory
Act (ILSA). This new act gave back to the regulators the capacity to ensure ￿nan-
cial stability by empowering them with the ability to set and enforce capital adequacy
standards. With their new powers, the three federal regulators were quick to act on
strengthening capital adequacy standards and by April 1985, all three regulators agreed
that minimum capital ratios should be set and enforced for all commercial banks.
4 Conclusion
Most models of banking behaviour either ignore the capital decision for banks or assume
that capital requirements are a binding constraint. This is largely inconsistent with
what is observed in reality. A brief glance at the data reveals that banks tend to hold
capital well in excess of what is required by regulatory guidelines.
17Reinke (1995), pg. 147.
18As quoted in Reinke (1995), pg. 148.
25This paper provides a model of bank ￿nancing decisions where the level of capital is
determined within a pro￿t maximising equilibrium. It is shown that optimality involves
balancing the reduction in expected costs associated with regulatory breach with the
excess cost of ￿nancing from increasing capital. The results also demonstrate that
when the equilibrium probability of regulatory breach is less than one half, banks are
expected to hold a bu⁄er of capital above o¢ cial regulatory requirements - that is, banks
are expected to hold precautionary capital.
Previous authors have suggested that ￿ market discipline￿has been the driver be-
hind the observed over-compliance with capital regulations. The idea that banks hold
precautionary capital because of market incentives is quite reasonable. Nevertheless,
given that the Federal safety net still exists, one would expect market incentives (while
possibly improved with a weakening of the safety net over time) to remain somewhat
sti￿ ed. Consequently, there must be another reason for observing non-binding capital
requirements, this paper therefore provides an alternative - although complementary -
explanation as to why banks hold precautionary capital. It is likely that this phe-
nomenon of non-binding capital requirements can be explained by some combination of
market discipline as well as what is proposed in this paper.
We also point to the large di⁄erences in cross-national capital ratios observed in the
last decade and suggest that this may re￿ ect varying degrees of cross-national regulatory
forbearance. The implications of the model suggest that the fact that U.S. and U.K.
banks hold more precautionary capital than their counterparts in Europe and Japan
implies that U.S. and U.K. regulators must be more severe with punishment in the event
of regulatory breach. We look at anecdotal evidence from the U.S. which is suggestive
that one reason for believing that U.S. regulatory authorities are relatively stringent
is the result of political pressure from Congress to ￿ keep the banks in check￿after the
politically sensitive decision was made to provide a de facto bailout to U.S. banks in the
aftermath of the Latin American debt crises.
The results and implications of this paper provide new insights to the debate on
capital and its adequacy. Although theory alone will not provide us with de￿nitive
answers, this paper points to the directions that future lines of empirical enquiry should
take to advance our understanding of prudential regulation.
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We start with (2) from the main text
(L ￿ X) + r(L ￿ X) ￿ (1 + i)D < 0
=) ￿(1 + r)X < ￿(1 + r)L + (1 + i)D




Substituting in (1) we have














L ￿ ^ X (A2)
Proof. (Proposition 1)
Substituting the balance sheet constraint into (5) for D, di⁄erentiating with respect




= i ￿ ￿ ￿ BK = 0 (A3)
or
￿BK = ￿ ￿ i (A4)








f(X)dX. Note the su¢ cient condition for an








































































> 0. That is, the equilibrium probability of bankruptcy is increasing in ￿
and r and decreasing in i and c.
Proof. (Corollary 2)
Recall from corollary 1 that Pr
h




















We know that the right hand side of this expression is increasing in ￿ and r and decreasing
in i and c. Thus any changes in ￿, r, i and c must correspond with changes in K￿ to
maintain equilibrium. Suppose @￿ > 0 which leads to an increase in optimal probability
of bankruptcy which can only be achieved through a decrease in the optimal critical
threshold ^ X￿ which can be achieved by reducing the optimal capital level K￿, that is
@K￿
@￿ < 0. This can also be shown more directly by considering the optimality condition












@￿ and noting BKK = @2B









Consider now an increase in i, that is @i > 0. An increase in i leads to a reduction in
￿ which must be associated with a rise in ^ X￿. However, a rise in i leads to a reduction
in ^ X￿ since @ ^ X￿
@i = 1
1+r (K￿ ￿ L) ￿ 0 and K 2 [0;L]. Thus K￿ must unambiguously
rise in response to an increase in i, in other words @K￿
@i > 0. Once again, this result can












@i and recalling that @2B








Let @c > 0 which results in a decrease in ￿. A decrease in ￿ can only be achieved
through a rise in ^ X￿ and therefore K￿, that is, @K￿
@c > 0. Finally, suppose @r > 0 that
causes an increase in ￿ which must be associated with a fall in ^ X￿. Note however that
31@ ^ X￿
@r = 1+i




Rearranging the condition for regulatory breach
￿
^ X ￿ X
￿
< q (L ￿ X), we have
X >



































r ￿ i ￿ q (1 + r)
(1 + r)(1 ￿ q)
￿
L ￿ XR (A11)
Proof. (Proposition 2)
Substituting the balance sheet constraint into (10) for D, di⁄erentiating with respect




= i ￿ ￿ ￿ RK = 0 (A12)
or
￿RK = ￿ ￿ i (A13)








f(X)dX. Note the su¢ cient condition for









(1 + r)(1 ￿ q)
￿
















































































is, for a given distribution of X, the equilibrium probability of regulatory breach is
increasing in ￿ and r and decreasing in q, i and cR.
Proof. (Corollary 4)























￿ ￿. Suppose that regulators decide to impose more stringent capital
requirements on banks, that is, @q > 0. We have already shown that the optimal
probability of regulatory breach is decreasing in q, therefore @￿
@q < 0. We require an
increase in the critical level of losses for there to be a fall in the optimal probability of
regulatory breach. Note however, that the right hand side of the inequality within the










R ￿ L] ￿ 0
since K 2 [0;L]. Thus there must be an unambiguous rise in the demand for capital







@cR > 0 follows the proof that @ ^ K￿
@c > 0 in corollary 2.
Proof. (Proposition 3)
Noting that with a symmetrical distribution the expected value of X lies in the the
middle of the the range of possible values of X such that Pr[X > E (X)] = Pr[X < E (X)] =
1
2, where E (X) = L
2 since X 2 [0;L].
1. This part is straight forward, if K￿
R is chosen such that the equilibrium probability
of regulatory breach ￿ is equal to one half, that is Pr[X > X￿
R] = 1
2, then it must
be the case that X￿
R = E (X) and expected precautionary regulatory capital is
zero.
2. If K￿
R is chosen such that the equilibrium probability of regulatory breach ￿ is less
than one half, that is Pr[X > X￿
R] < 1
2, then it must be the case that X￿
R > E (X)
and expected precautionary regulatory capital are positive. As noted in the main
text, the expected value of precautionary capital, if any, is given by the the partial
expectation of X over the range of X that would lead to expected precautionary














2 and F (X￿
R) > 1






































































R is chosen such that the equilibrium probability of regulatory breach ￿ is
greater than one half, that is Pr[X > X￿
R] > 1
2, then it must be the case that X￿
R <
E (X) and expected precautionary regulatory capital is negative, alternatively, we
can view this as an expected de￿ciency in regulatory capital for the bank. Recall
the expected value of capital de￿ciency, if any, is the partial expectation of X over















we can see that the expected value of capital de￿ciency is just the negative of the
expected value of precautionary capital, leading to the desired result in the text.
Proof. (Lemma 1)




























(1 ￿ q) (A20)
Rearranging leads to the desired result.
Proof. (Lemma 2)
1. Recall from (A11) that X￿
R =
^ X￿￿qL











Noting that K 2 [0;L] now consider:
X￿
R ￿ ^ X￿ =
































Therefore we have ^ X￿ ￿ X￿
R and
R L
XR f(X)dX = Pr[X > X￿
R] ￿
R L
^ X f(X)dX =
Pr
h
X > ^ X￿
i
.





























is the equilibrium probability of bankruptcy. Since part 1
tells us that ￿ ￿ ￿, from (A22) this can only be the case if
c
cR
(1 ￿ q) ￿ 1 (A23)
35or
cR ￿ c(1 ￿ q) (A24)
Proof. (Proposition 4)
Lemma 2 gives us an upper limit for the per dollar cost of breach cR ￿ c(1 ￿ q).
Lemma 1 gives us a lower limit for the per dollar cost of breach cR > 2￿c(1 ￿ q)
below which banks are expected to have a regulatory capital de￿ciency. It follows that
both conditions can only be satis￿ed if 2￿ < 1, or alternatively ￿ < 1
2. That is, the
equilibrium probability of bank failure is less than half and banks are therefore expected
to survive.
36